

COPY FOR MR. ALLEN DULLES, CIA

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AUG 12 1953

Memorandum for Mr. C. D. Jackson

Subject: Soviet Gestures to Japan

I hope the attached memorandum will be helpful in connection with your inquiry of July 28 on Soviet gestures to Japan.

You will note that there have been some recent "friendly" gestures — not all of which are post-Stalin — but, despite the obvious vulnerability of Japan to such overtures, they seem to be only part of a general pattern of diplomatic moves by the Soviet, seeking to eliminate minor areas of friction with no real cost, in order to gain favorable publicity. There appears to be nothing concrete to indicate a major shift in the Soviet attitude toward Japan.

WALTER S. SMITH

Attachment

Soviet and Communist Chinese
Gestures Toward Japan (Conf.)

Copies to:

General Cutler
Mr. Allen Dulles

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SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE GESTURES TOWARD JAPAN

PROBLEM:

Have the USSR and Communist China increased significantly their overtures to Japan, particularly with a view to more extensive trade relations; and as a result, is the stability and western orientation of Japan likely to be affected?

CONCLUSION:

The USSR and Communist China have made some "friendly" gestures toward Japan, not all of which are post-Stalin, and some of which pertain to trade relations, but these do not seem to represent any basic shift in Soviet policy toward Japan and seem to be in line with current Soviet tactics to eliminate minor areas of friction at no real cost to the Communist world.

Although Japan is increasingly vulnerable for internal political and economic reasons to a "peace offensive" from the Soviet Union and Communist China -- a vulnerability probably increased by the truce in Korea -- it is unlikely, without a basic shift in Soviet policy, not yet apparent, that the stability and western orientation of Japan will be affected, nor will there be a dangerous increase in Japanese trade with the USSR and Communist China.

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DISCUSSION:

Japan has become increasingly vulnerable, for internal political and economic reasons, to a "peace" offensive from the Soviet Union and Communist China. This vulnerability has probably been increased by the truce in Korea.

In recent months, both Moscow and Peking have taken steps, or suggested that they might take steps, consistent with the adoption of a more friendly attitude toward Japan. These steps have been part of a pattern of diplomatic moves since Stalin's death which served to eliminate minor areas of friction with the West at no real cost to the Communist world and at the gain of favorable publicity. In the case of Japan the moves have not been unprecedented and in some cases reflect policies initiated last autumn or even earlier. Their purpose does not appear to be a normalization of relations with the existing Yoshida Government. Rather they appear directed to popular opinion in Japan and to left-wing and nationalist opponents of the Yoshida Government for the purpose of generating pressure for discarding Japan's present western orientation. While the Kremlin has likewise encouraged a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc, the price of such relations still apparently remains Japanese rejection of military ties with the United States.

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Gestures. Japan has been included in the series of "friendly gestures" initiated by the Soviet bloc since the death of Stalin. On April 6, the USSR returned a considerable number of Japanese fishermen and their boats seized in the past months. On July 18, the Soviet mission in Tokyo announced a gift of \$10,000 for flood relief. And on July 22, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov talked for one hour with the leading Japanese "peace partisan" and winner of a Stalin "peace" prize, Ikuo Oyama. He was reported to have told Oyama that concrete steps would be taken to re-establish normal relations with Japan and that economic and cultural relations could be established without waiting for formal diplomatic relations. He was also reported to have indicated that the return of the Japanese war criminals held by the USSR could be arranged. In addition, trade of limited scope has continued involving primarily Sakhalin coal for Japanese ships and the repair of Soviet ships.

Communist China has also made numerous gestures involving the conclusion of trade agreements with individual Japanese exporters; the grant of some \$50,000 for flood relief; the return of fishermen and their vessels; and numerous gifts from Peking Red Cross.

These gestures to Japan are not, however, all of a post-Stalin development. Negotiations for the repatriation of the several

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thousand Japanese who began to return from Communist China in March commenced last autumn. Chinese Communist youth organizations sent Japanese student bodies relief funds in February; while in January the Kyodo news agency reported that a member of the Soviet Mission had indicated that Japanese fishermen might regain their pre-war fishing privileges off the Kamchatka peninsula. The report of Soviet willingness to repatriate war prisoners is only the latest of such rumors which began last January. They were based in the past on hints contained in letters from the war criminals and a reported statement in March by a member of the Soviet mission in Tokyo to a Japanese delegation. Finally, in the case of the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels, a Japanese foreign office official noted a modification in Soviet policy beginning late last autumn. On the other hand, the seizures have continued over the past months notwithstanding the recent releases.

Soviet Attitude Toward Japan. Aside from rumors and minor gestures, there is nothing concrete to indicate a major shift in the Soviet attitude toward Japan. This attitude was enunciated by the Soviet delegate in the UN Security Council on September 18, 1952, when the USSR vetoed Japan's entry into the UN on the grounds that it was neither independent nor peace-loving but rather an American satellite. Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress in 1952 justified Soviet refusal to sign the San Francisco treaty with Japan on the grounds that it was aimed at turning Japan into an "American Far Eastern military base." He predicted, however, that

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the Japanese people for whom the USSR had "deep respect" would inevitably throw off the "yoke of foreign bondage" and become an independent democratic state.

The most recent analysis of developments in Japan, a TASS statement dated July 4, continued to attack the Yoshida Government as a US puppet and to stress that the US intends to use its military aid for Japan for "its own aggressive plans." TASS predicted however, that popular indignation with this policy "may produce quite unexpected results of a political as well as a social nature."

Soviet Tactics. Up to the present, Soviet and Communist Chinese tactics have been consistent with a policy of encouraging resistance to governmental policy on the part of opposition elements and "the people." If the Soviet Union were sincerely interested in a normalization of relations with the Japanese Government, then Molotov could presumably have found more appropriate channels to indicate this fact than a leading symbol of Communist agitation like the "peace partisan" Oyama.

It is entirely possible, however, that the USSR will endeavor through diplomatic means to capitalize on a Korean truce to generate pressures within Japan for a withdrawal of US troops and a more independent policy. Moscow has stated in its propaganda, for example, that a Korean truce removes all justification for retaining US bases in Japan. Any Soviet effort along these lines would

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presumably take the guise of an effort to normalize relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, possibly including an offer to negotiate a peace treaty. The USSR would probably find it necessary in such an effort to attempt settlement of such outstanding problems as the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war or territorial questions, particularly Soviet occupation of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands. An offer of a formal cessation of hostilities, moreover, would appear ultimately to entail support of Japan's efforts to enter the UN.

Any such gesture, however, probably would be carefully calculated so as not to redound to the benefit of the Yoshida Government. Moreover, it would appear essential from the Soviet viewpoint, and Soviet propaganda has vigorously endorsed this view, that any Soviet rapprochement with Japan would involve a severance of Japan's military ties with the US and the abandonment of Japan's pro-Western orientation. An overture of this nature could not be expected to result in an actual rapprochement with the existing Japanese Government. It would certainly serve, however, to aggravate existing economic and political pressures within Japan for a greater independence of policy and for terminating its virtual isolation from the Soviet bloc.

Dept of State
August 4, 1950

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